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Faculty Association
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An Independent Membership Organization of Faculty at the University of California, Los Angeles
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 For more information, see the FA at UCLA Website at <http://ucfaculty.org/ucla>

Spring 2005

FA TOWNHALL MEETINGS

COME, HEAR THESE SPEAKERS, ASK QUESTIONS

Valen Johnson

Professor of Biostatistics
 University of Texas, Houston
 Author of

**Grade Inflation: A Crisis in Higher
 Education**

Friday, April 15, 2005

Faculty Center, California Rm, 2 pm
 Refreshments

GRADE INFLATION SMOG

*A Review of Grade Inflation: A Crisis in Higher
 Education by Valen Johnson*

Professors at universities and colleges across the nation acknowledge the problem of grade inflation. In the Fall 2004 FA newsletter, we included a chart that showed the rise of upper and lower division GPAs at UCLA from 2.5 for upper division and 2.3 for lower division in 1926 to 3.3 and 3.1, in 2004 (www.uclafaculty.org/Newsletters/GPIUCLA.htm). Although the magnitude of this trend varies from university to university, this general upward pattern is common to most. We're all choking on the smog of grade inflation, but few of us have attempted to clear the air. The problem is simply too huge and too diffuse. Valen Johnson is an exception. He took advantage of a unique opportunity at another major university to document the effects that this pollution has on two of the most important measures of healthy function within higher education— student evaluation of instruction and course selection. In *Grade Inflation: A Crisis in Higher Education*, he describes the statistical analyses of data collected from students at Duke in the late nineties, and what these analyses reveal about the cancerous effects of grade inflation.

(Continued below, page 2) ▼▼▼

Sheila Kuehl

Senator

D-Santa Monica

Friday, May 20, 2005

Faculty Center, Sequoia Rm, 2 pm

Co-sponsored by the UCLA Emeriti Assn.

Refreshments

Senator Kuehl will talk about a number of subjects important to UC faculty and emeriti, which include budget issues, effective lobbying strategies for UC, health care, pension reform, and more.

**The UCLA FA Launches a Statewide
 Pension Reform Initiative**

The Faculty Association at UCLA submitted an initiative entitled the California Public Employee Pension Reform Act to the Attorney General's office for title and summary on Feb. 10, 2005. This initiative includes the features of pension reform that Governor Schwarzenegger, Assemblyman Richman, R-Northridge, and the Jarvis Taxpayers Association all favor: as of 2007 there shall be no more Defined Benefit Plans (DBP) and all new public employees in the state shall enroll in a Defined Contribution Plan (DCP). The upper limit of the employer's contribution in most public agencies would be 6%. The big difference between the FA initiative and all the other, similar ones is the exclusion of UC from pension reform. (Continued on page 9)

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► *Are you a member of the Faculty Association? Is member written on your mailing label? If not, please join the FA at UCLA page 10*
Executive Board? Contact us ucfa@earthlink.net



CLEARING THE AIR

Valen Johnson happened to be a professor of statistics at Duke University when that university recognized it had a problem with grade inflation in the late nineties. By 1997, about 45% of all undergrad grades at Duke were in the A range while fewer than 15% were in the C+ or lower range. Faculty and administrators at Duke formed taskforces and created a website (www.gradeinflation.com) to track grade inflation nationwide. Johnson, after being asked to join a committee on grade inflation, decided to apply sophisticated statistical techniques to grade data he obtained from the registrar. After discarding the notion that overall increases in average grades were the cause of most problems usually associated with grade inflation, he began to examine disparities in the grades awarded across departments and by professors within departments. Based on student data at Duke, he developed a statistical formula, the achievement index, which adjusted student grades to remove biases caused by uneven grading practices. The grades of some students---many in sciences, math, and economics---were adjusted upwards to account for stringent grading policies in these fields, but the grades of others---mainly in the arts, humanities, and social sciences---were lowered to adjust for grading leniency in those fields. Johnson believed that the adjustment scheme would pressure departments to reign in grade distributions so that eventually the adjustments would become minimal or even disappear. Humanities professors voted down the proposal to adjust grades when, after much debate and acrimony, it reached Duke's Arts and Sciences Council.

The achievement index was too radical an attempt to normalize grades, but the Duke administration still wanted to learn more about the consequences of grading practices. They allowed Johnson to conduct an online experiment, coined DUET (Duke Undergraduates Evaluate Teaching), to collect information about students' evaluation of teaching and their reasons for course selection. But even this more modest foray into understanding the role of grades in student evaluations and course selection at Duke met with unexpected but powerful resistance by many faculty. Initially, the DUET experiment was approved to run for three years, but it was stopped after only two online evaluation sessions (one in October of 1998 and the other in March of 1999) after intense opposition from faculty in Asian, African, Germanic, and Slavic languages, as well as 21 of 28 faculty in math. These faculty bitterly opposed the collection of course evaluation data online because it allowed students to view both other student evaluations of classes and median course grades for all classes at Duke. The math department also feared that documentation of more stringent grading practices in math and the sciences would negatively impact course enrollments and offerings in their discipline. The foreign language faculty feared that documentation of grading leniency in their fields would damage their academic status at the university. It was one thing to have students generally know that math, sciences, and economics teachers graded more stringently than humanities, social sciences, and foreign language teachers, but it was quite another to quantify those differences statistically and make that information available to students.

Addressing grade inflation at Duke seemed doomed. Arts and humanities professors blocked the achievement index, and math and many foreign language professors blocked the online experiment that gave students access to median course grades and evaluations. But there was one ray of hope. Before DUET was terminated, Johnson managed to get data from two online student evaluation sessions, which, even after initial technical problems, provided him with data to examine grade inflation in an objective way. Applying statistical analyses to the DUET data, Johnson estimated the magnitude of grade inflation at Duke, studied the role grades played in student evaluations of teaching, and quantified the level of disparities of grading practices across departments and professors. In *Grade Inflation*, Johnson shows that grade inflation is the source of much of the smog that fogs the paths of many students and professors.

THE DUKE EXPERIMENT: Major Smog Test in the East

In October 1998, non-first year students at Duke University were asked to complete web-based questionnaires about the courses they had completed the previous semester. In return for their participation in the survey, they were given access to student evaluations completed by other students for other courses taught at Duke, the mean grade distributions in those classes, and their own adjusted GPAs. First year students, mostly freshmen, were offered the same deal, except that they were asked to complete the questionnaire for courses they were currently taking. Course evaluation data collected from all students who completed the online evaluations were linked to their student records--which include transcript information, SAT scores, high school GPAs--and to the courses that they accessed to check mean grade distributions at Duke and the courses they eventually selected.

The questionnaire contained 38 items. The first question asked the format of the course, the second whether it was an elective or requirement, and the third the level of prior interest in the course subject matter before enrollment. Question 20 asked how the class was graded on a continuum from lenient to severe, Question 22 the student's expected grade, and Question 23 how aware the student was before enrollment about how the class was graded. The rest of the questions fell roughly into the following groups.

The Questionnaire (for a complete copy, go to www.uclafaculty.org/Newsletters/duet.htm)

Group 1: Instructor Interaction (concern, encouraged questions, enthusiasm, availability, rating, communication, critical thinking, usefulness of exams, related course to research)

Group 2: Structure of the Class (relevance of classes and assignments, instructor organization & knowledge, knew goals of course)

Group 3: Satisfaction with Progress (end interest in subject, learned course material, comparative learning, accuracy of exams, another course? recommend course?)

Group 4: Difficulty (difficulty, challenging assignments, hrs/wk on assign, stringency of grading, hrs/wk in class)

Group 5: Student Work (written, reading, class attendance)

Response Rate

Of the 6,471 eligible full-time, degree seeking students, 1,894 (29%) participated (self selected). About 945 participated in both the fall and spring surveys.

Causes of Non Response

Technical glitches to get non-Duke passwords

System failure to cope with the load of responses

Women less like to respond than men (33% vs 25%)

African Americans (14%) less likely to participate than Caucasians (29%)

but, in general, few African American, Hispanic, or Native American students at Duke.

Fewer juniors/seniors than freshman/sophomores

Statistical Validity

Effects of non-response are difficult to measure, but response rates did not appear to be correlated with the response patterns of known subpopulations of students at Duke. In any case, study conclusions based on DUET data apply to nearly 30% of all Duke undergrads and nearly 40% of first and second year students.

THE RESULTS: Identifying the Pollutants

Major Variables that Affect Student Evaluation of Instruction

In the analyses of these data, item responses were standardized by subtracting the mean response collected from that student on that item from that item's response, and then dividing by the standard deviation of that group of responses. The mean is the sum of numbers divided by the number of cases, and the median is the number in the middle. This standardization was performed in an attempt to minimize biases that might be attributed to student aptitude, gender, race, academic major, academic year, prior grade expectation, etc.

The first online DUET student evaluation took place for 3 weeks in October of 1998. Students were asked to evaluate courses they had completed the last semester, which included sophomores, juniors, seniors, and second semester freshmen. Four variables emerged from the DUET data that had a high correlation with how students evaluated instruction. These variables included Course Rating by all students (i.e., the consensus Course Rating); Prior Interest of student in the subject matter of the course; standardized Student Grade; and standardized Class Mean grade (standardized by classes taken by that student in the given semester). Table 1 shows the values of the regression coefficients when these variables were used to predict student evaluations of instruction.

Table 1: Effects of Variables on Student Evaluations
(regression coefficient averages for each group)


	<u>Student Grade</u>	<u>Class Mean</u>	<u>Prior Interest</u>	<u>Course Rating</u>
Group 1 Instructor Interaction	0.178	0.067	0.148	0.494
Group 2 Structure of Course	0.102	-0.039	0.151	0.398
Group 3 Satisfaction with Progress	0.272	-0.024	0.303	0.337
Group 4 Difficulty	-0.168	-0.129	0.046	0.531
Group 5 Student Work	0.05	0.003	0.083	0.258

With the exception of the coefficient of Class Mean on Student Work, all values were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In all categories of questions, regression coefficients are highest for the consensus Course Rating. In Group 1 (Instructor Interaction) for example, the Course Rating coefficient is 0.494, with Student Grade (0.178) a bit more than a third of that, and Prior Interest (0.148) just less than a third. The relatively high regression coefficient for Course Rating is an important confirmation that most students in a particular class agree about the level of success of that class. So student evaluations of instruction do carry important information. However, other factors also exert significant influences on students' evaluation of instruction. In Group 1, which is arguably the most important category—including items concerning the instructor's knowledge of course material, organization of material, demand for critical or original thinking, concern, enthusiasm, and availability—standardized Student Grade had a positive coefficient of 0.178. In all of the other groups of items—which include questions about course structure, satisfaction with progress, difficulty, and student level of work in the class—consensus Course Rating was again the highest predictor of student rating of instruction, prior Interest in course subject was second, and Student Grade third. Interestingly, standardized Class Mean grades had significantly less influence on how students evaluated instruction, at least after account was made for their grade in the class (through the Student Grade variable). Apparently, overall stringency or leniency of grading was not as important to students as individual feedback concerning their performance.


Before and After: Effect of Grade on Student Evaluation

For freshmen, Johnson had two sets of evaluations for the same classes: one collected before the students knew their grades during their first semester at Duke, and another evaluation conducted after receiving their first semester grades. These two measurements taken from the same student for the same class provide a direct method for examining how much received grade and expected grades affected the freshmen evaluations of instruction. However, the statistical analyses of these data were complex because of all of the possible combinations of received and expected grades: for example, students who expected one grade (A or B) and got a lower one (B or C), or students who expected a low grade (B or C) and got a higher one (A or B). Johnson worked out the probabilities and regression coefficients for all the items on the questionnaire for expected and received grades and then worked out a statistical formula for comparing two grades—expected and received. The charts on the next page show the typical pattern of responses as a function of expected grade for items on the DUET questionnaire answered by freshmen before and after receiving a grade. The upward slope of the curves shows that as the expected grade increased, so did evaluations of instruction. In chart 1, the upward slope from the C- to the A+ range clearly shows the tendency of students to rate more highly those courses for which they expected higher grades. In chart 2, a graph of the results of student evaluations of "Instructor Enthusiasm" shows the same upward slope of higher received grades resulting in higher course evaluation.

**Chart 1:
Expected Grade Vs Instructor Organization**



**Chart 2:
Received Grade Vs Instructor Enthusiasm**



The interesting dip in the C+/B- juncture in Chart 2, then a spike upward likely shows the relatively large perceptual difference among undergraduates between the value of a C grade and a B grade. By contrasting the two evaluations of the same course--one obtained before the freshman had received a grade and one after--Johnson removed all other variables like gender, background, etc. and discovered highly significant, substantively important biasing effects of student grade on nearly all of the items of course evaluation.

Grading Disparities Across Disciplines and Student Course Selection

Using records of the course mean grades that students examined during the experiment in conjunction with records of the courses for which they later registered, Johnson was able to examine the influence of grading practices on student course selection. After students completed their evaluations, a computer record was made of the course evaluations that they read and the classes for which they looked at mean course grades. Over the two semester experiment, participating students viewed 9,434 histogram summaries of course evaluations and 42,325 mean course grades. In essence, the DUET survey kept track of the set of courses (the same course with different instructors) a student checked for mean grade before selecting a course.


Examining the results over fall and spring yielded a total of 197 courses for which students had both registered and viewed the mean grade of a previous offering of the same course with the same instructor, and for which the student had also examined the mean grade of at least one other version of the same course with a different instructor. Johnson then evaluated the effect of grading practices on, for example, a student choosing among three calculus courses taught by different instructors, after the student had checked the mean grades in these classes. He found that the odds that students selected the course with the higher mean grade was nearly 2 to 1 against a course with a lower mean grade.

Similarly for electives, students who participated in the DUET experiment were twice as likely to choose courses graded at an A- average as they were courses graded at a B average. This conclusion applies to courses chosen from within all academic divisions, and the effect likely results in a 50% decrease in the number of elective courses taken by undergrads in the natural sciences and mathematics, which grade more stringently.

The author was also interested in how students selected courses that satisfied distributional requirements. For example, if a course in statistics, calculus, and introduction to computer programming all satisfied the quantitative reasoning requirement, and a student checked the mean grades for these classes before making a decision on which class to take to fulfill the requirement, Johnson found that the odds that a student was likely to select the course that satisfied distributional requirements with the higher mean grade among other courses that satisfied the distributional requirements was 2.14 to 1.

He also compared grading practices across academic subjects by examining differences in the grades received by students in their major and other academic disciplines. The mean difference between a grade received in major and out-of-major across all majors was 0.18. This makes sense as students should get higher grades in their major than in other courses. The chart below illustrates these differences in grading practices graphically. For each subject, it shows how much higher, on average, students' grades were in their own major than in these out-of-major classes. For example, reading the ladder from the top, non-Chemistry majors get about 3/4 GPA (0.76) higher in their major than in Chemistry. Going down a rung, non-Math majors get a little less than 3/4 GPA (0.73) higher in their major than in Math. Going below the mean, non-Literature majors get a lower GPA (-0.18) in their major than in Literature classes. At the bottom of the ladder, non-Drama majors get about 1/4 GPA (-0.24) lower in their major than in Drama classes.

Table 2: Grading Practices Across Departments



Johnson's data also shows that students who major in, for example, economics get higher grades in non-major courses like drama than they do in courses in their major. Students in art get higher grades in their major than they do in other courses. This data contradicts the common notion that higher grades in, say, music and drama, can be attributed to special abilities of students in those subjects by showing that other students (non-majors) also receive higher than their average marks in music and drama courses.

Grade Adjustment

To illustrate how grade adjustment might work, Johnson adjusts the grades of two students who had the same GPAs but had taken very different classes. One student at Duke took mostly humanities, social sciences (no economics), and foreign languages. His GPA was 3.38 and rank in class was 721. After using the formula and adjusting grades, his GPA dropped to 3.20 and his adjusted rank in class was 947. The second student took more math and science courses, as well as a few economics courses. She had a 3.37 GPA and ranked 733. After applying the adjustment formula to her transcript scores, her GPA rose to 3.61 and her adjusted rank rose to 378.

Classes in which all students received the same grade had no effect on adjusted GPA, because grades for such classes did not differentiate between the academic performance of students in the class. This property of adjusted GPAs would (hopefully) discourage professors from giving all their students A's, because such a practice would not affect the adjusted GPAs of any of their students.

CONCLUSIONS

Myths about College Grading and Faculty Assessment

1. Student grades do not bias student evaluations of teaching
2. Student evaluations of teaching provide unbiased measures of instructional effectiveness
3. High course grades imply high levels of student achievement
4. Student course selection decisions are unaffected by expected grading practices
5. Grades assigned in unregulated academic environments have a consistent and objective meaning across classes, departments, and institutions.

Statistics and the Sources of the Smog

1. Student evaluations of teaching are not reliable indicators of teaching effectiveness.
2. There are three major variables that predict a student's evaluation of teaching:
 - a) how other students rate the class,
 - b) student's prior interest in the subject, and
 - c) grade a student expects to receive.
3. High grade distributions cannot be associated with higher levels of student achievement.
4. Differences in grading practices have a substantial impact on student enrollments, and cause fewer students to enroll in those fields that grade more stringently.
5. Grading practices differ systematically between disciplines and instructors, and these disparities cause serious inequities in assessment of student performance.

REFORM

What's the Best Catalytic Converter to Lower Grade Inflation Levels?

Moderate and Local

1. Encourage institutional dialogue.
2. Provide instructors with more information about their university's grading practices. Many professors do not know how their grade distributions compare to their colleagues' and how their departmental standards compare to others'.
3. Provide students with feedback on how inequitable grading practices affect their GPAs. Involve students in the discussion and possible reform process.
4. Include information about course grading practices on student transcripts. (Done at Columbia, Dartmouth, Indiana, and Eastern Kentucky; to see the Dartmouth transcript go to www.uclafaculty.org/Newsletters/dartmouth_transcript.htm).

Radical

5. Constrain course grade distributions. This practice is common in graduate and professional schools. At UCLA law school there is periodic review of the grade distributions (e.g., 20-40-40 or 20-60-20 for A-B-C) to insure compatibility of grades with other law schools.

Middle Ground

6. Allow students optionally to report adjusted GPAs on their transcripts.
7. Use adjusted grades and GPAs to establish honors distinctions.
8. Either selectively exclude student evaluations of teaching from instructor summaries, or adjust them according to regression models like that used at the U of Washington (www.washington.edu/oea/iasforms.htm).
9. Using student evaluations of teaching exclusively, primarily, or uncritically for faculty assessment creates pressure on faculty to lower grading standards.

WHERE'S THE HARM?

Who does grade inflation harm? Because uneven grading practices reduce the value of the student GPA in assessing student performance, acceptance decisions for students hoping to attend medical school, law school, business or graduate school rely more and more on standardized tests (i.e., MCAT, LSAT, GMAT, or GRE), and less on faculty evaluations and actual performance as an undergraduate. Faculty forfeit their influence in determining which students are selected to move on to the next level, and students are subjected to arbitrary culling based on standardized tests that often measure little more than a student's ability to take standardized tests.

High GPAs may help students get a job, but if their grades weren't warranted and they can't "make the grade" in their new positions, long-term prospects might not be so good. They end up in jobs for which they lack qualification.

And what of the large group of soft B students who in previous years may have been C and D students? These are often the students who understand the dynamics of grade inflation and use this knowledge to gain academic credentials without satisfying any reasonable standard of achievement. The attitude engendered by such gaming of the system demoralizes faculty who sense students' indifference and low motivation, but who are nonetheless forced by student and administrative pressures to give higher than warranted grades to maintain enrollments and high student evaluations.

There's another group of students who are particularly injured by grade inflation—those students who come to UCLA from high schools where grades were also inflated. How are they to realistically assess their own academic talents? Do their A's indicate success and a potential for a career in a given field, or are they performing at only a marginally acceptable level of competency? College should be an opportunity for them to discover the subjects they like, and whether or not they are capable of pursuing a career in these areas. It is a basic thesis of *Grade Inflation: A Crisis in College Education* that grade inflation is particularly harmful to these students because the smog of upward grade pressure prevents them from clearly evaluating their own level of accomplishment, thus depriving them of an important tool of self discovery.

We, both students and faculty, are trapped in a culture of grade inflation, where students choose courses and majors based on grades, and professors are evaluated according to their grading policies. This culture obscures students' quest for education in the broadest sense and dulls the satisfaction of professors for aiding them in their quest.



FA Launches Statewide Initiative (Continued from page 1)

There is no question that some kind of reform is needed to prevent the state from incurring pension obligations so high that many other state programs, like funding higher education, would be jeopardized. Several, huge, underfunded pension plans in CA currently require large state contributions. Both CalPERS, the nation's largest public fund with over 1 M active members, 413,272 retirees, and \$180 B in assets, and Cal-STRS, the largest teachers' retirement fund in the US, with membership of about 754,000 and assets of \$116.2 B, are underfunded by more than \$20 B. The state's general fund contributions to CalPERS alone are expected to jump from \$160 M in 2000 to \$2.6 B this year and to \$3.5 B in 2009. Reform focuses on eliminating DB plans with their potential to pass on to the state high, unfunded liability and offering only DCP plans much like the 401k retirement plans offered to employees in the private sector.

DB plans are employer sponsored retirement plans that provide an annual payment based on age at retirement, years of service, and average highest salary. The employer is obligated to pay the DBP benefit in retirement, and in the event of insufficient pension funds, the state government assumes liability to meet those obligations. Over the last 25 years, the state has paid somewhere between 12% and 21% annually on average for most of its employees in DB plans. This amount contrasts sharply with the average employer contribution to DC plans across the nation—closer to 6%.

DC plans set limits on employer contributions and therefore on future state liability. For example, the current initiatives for pension reform have set the limit of 6% for employer contributions for most public employees and less if employees contribute less. These “pre-paid” retirement accounts help the employer in allocating its resources without mounting future liability and help the employees by allowing a flexible range of contributions based on how much they want to save. Most DC plans offer a range of investment choice. In retirement, they can withdraw whatever amount they wish from their own accounts, based on how well their DCP investments have performed and for how long they want them to last. After an initial vesting period, DCP accounts are also easy to roll over to a new job, whereas traditional DB plans favor those who stay with one employer for a long time. In fact, DB plans are, in part, subsidized by those who change jobs. In a mobile generation, many people want the portability of DC plans.

If the Richman bill ACA 5 or the Jarvis Taxpayers initiative were to pass, the fiscal impact on UC would be severe because it would restrict its ability to recruit and retain faculty who would likely be offered richer pension plans from other institutions, particularly private ones. The impact on UC would be on a totally different level from other public agencies in CA because UC maintains its worldwide excellence in undergraduate education, graduate schools, medical schools and centers, and in law and other professional schools precisely because it can compete with the compensation and pension offerings of private universities to recruit and retain faculty.

To counteract any reduction in pension benefit, UC could increase salaries or raise the “faculty parity” percentage to bridge the salary gap with its peer institutions. This faculty-only salary increase is generated by following the state approved California Post Secondary Education Commission salary methodology. UC has not done so in these tighter budget times because of growing competitive pressures to increase off-scale increments for some faculty rather than raise the salaries of all faculty on the step-ladder system. It is also likely that increasing compensation would be the way that other public agencies in CA would cope with more restrictive DCP retirement plans if the pension reform initiatives pass, thereby mitigating many of the gains of shifting from DBP to DCP plans.

The FA initiative excludes UC from pension reform to preserve its ability to offer competitive retirement plans for the purpose of recruitment and retention of faculty. Another reason has to do with the success of the UCRP pension plan and the importance of allowing the University to offer competitive retirement plans. Far from being underfunded, UC’s pension fund has not required employee contributions for the last 15 years. UC has about 123,000 current employees, including over 9,000 tenure-track and tenured faculty, in DBP plans and about 40,000 retirees. The actuarial value of UCRP’s accrued liabilities as of July 2004 was \$35 B. The actuarial value of the assets in the trust was \$41.3 B, an excess of \$6.3 B. The success of UC’s DBP plan has provided retirement income to all its employees and helped the university attract and retain high-quality faculty and staff.

One source of criticism of public pension management in the state has been the ability of the Boards that oversee these funds to vote for increases in pension benefits in times of prosperity only to find out that these obligations cannot be met when returns dip. Also, many of the Boards of Directors are themselves covered by the plans they oversee. The benefit structure of UC is unique among public agencies. UC and its pension plan are a public trust regulated by the independent Board of Regents whose members watch over the interests of both the University and the State of California which supports it. Because the Regents do not participate in the UCRP themselves, they can be relied upon to ensure that the Plan’s assets and liabilities continue to be balanced and managed responsibly without burdening the state with future unfunded liability.

If UC were to come under the restrictions of the new pension reform initiatives active in California, the current employees in the DBP plan would suffer from being in a closed fund with resources coming only from investment return, employee contributions, and any contractual employer contributions, with no new employees paying into the fund. Those in the orphaned plan would soon have to make higher and higher contributions to maintain adequate funding levels.

It is still possible that the legislature will take up Constitutional Amendment 5 by Richman, but so far, they’ve been slow to do so and resistant to exclude UC. The Governor and the Jarvis Taxpayers Assoc. are getting ready to put the issue to a statewide vote in a special election in November. If this comes to pass, the Jarvis Taxpayers Assoc. and the Governor might come to recognize the importance of excluding UC from pension reform and adopt the FA version as a compromise position. If they don’t, they will have to brace for UC’s opposition, in addition to the opposition of PERS, STRS, and other public agencies not in favor of the new DCP restrictions. In addition, proponents of initiatives and bills that include UC will have to prepare for a possible legal challenge to its historic autonomy as a public trust.

To put some further pressure on excluding UC from pension reform, as part of our rights under the CA Public Records and CA Constitution, the FA has asked Tom Campbell, Dir. of the Dept of Finance, for any working papers, communications, or analysis of the fiscal impact of including UC in pension reform. ◆◆◆

**Application to
JOIN THE UCLA FACULTY ASSOCIATION**

2004-5 FA at UCLA

Executive Board Members

Dwight Read, Chair, anthro
Donald Buth, organismic bio.
Steve Cederbaum, psychia
Susan Downey, art history
Sheila Greibach, comp sci
Gordon Kipling, English
Karen Orren, poli sci
Carole Pateman, poli sci
Andrew Sabl, policy studies
John Schumann, Appl. Ling
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BENEFITS

SALARIES

**WORKING
CONDITIONS**

UC POLICIES

LOBBYING

The Faculty Association at UCLA is a voluntary, dues-supported organization of UCLA Academic Senate members, founded about 30 years ago, with an Executive Board, Bylaws, a dues structure, and a Research Director.

Purposes: The purpose of the FA is to influence the decisions of the University administration and the state legislature that affect faculty salaries, benefits, and working conditions broadly defined

Relation to the Academic Senate: The FA at UCLA supports the Senate in all academic matters. Because it has no state funding the FA at UCLA can and does engage in lobbying and other nonpartisan political activities on behalf of faculty.

Membership: The FA at UCLA membership is open to all faculty eligible for membership in the UCLA Academic Senate.

I wish to join the Faculty Association at UCLA. I agree to pay the following dues (choose one) by payroll deduction and to sign Form U669 below or by personal check. FA dues are tax deductible: either on Schedule A of your income tax to the extent that they and other profession-related and income-producing expenses exceed 2% of your adjusted gross income; or in some instances on Schedule C without the 2% limitation. Please check with your tax consultant.) AAUP members may claim a 20% reduction in FA dues.

_____ \$8.75 per/mo. for Assistant Professors and Acting Professors of Law

_____ \$13.50 per/mo. for Associate Professors

_____ \$18.00 per mo. for Professors

_____ Lecturers with security of employment, please designate the dues that most nearly approximates your salary range

_____ \$40.00 per year for Emeriti (by check only)

_____ Recalled Faculty: 50% of the dues for their rank (for example, per year \$42.00 for Assistant Professors; \$63 for Associates; and \$84 for professors (payable by check only)

_____ 50% discount for Second Member of a Family

Mail Completed Forms to:

FA at UCLA, P.O. Box 33336
Granada Hills, CA 91394

Or drop in Campus Mail to:

Prof. Ed Condren, UCLA FA Membership Chair
2317 Rolfe 153002

Employee Organization Membership Payroll Deduction Authorization UPAY 669 (10/80)

Last Name _____ First Name _____ Middle Initial _____ Dept. Employed at UC _____

Title at UC _____ Organization name: Faculty Association at UCLA Campus UCLA

Employee ID _____ Date _____ Action on this Form to Become Effective on Pay Period Beginning _____

Email Address _____ Monthly Deduction: Dues _____ Initiation Fees 0 General Assessment 0

I authorize the Regents of the University of California to withhold monthly or cease withholding from my earnings as an employee, membership dues, initiation fees, and general assessment as indicated above. I understand and agree to the arrangement whereby one total monthly deduction will be made by the University based upon the current rate of dues, initiation fees, and general assessments.

I also understand that changes in the rate of dues, initiation fees and general assessments may be made after notice to that effect is given to the University by the organization to which such authorized deductions are assigned and hereby expressly agree that pursuant to such notice the University may withhold from my earnings amounts either greater than or less than those shown above without obligation to inform me before doing so or to seek additional authorization from me for such withholdings. The University will remit the amount deducted to the official designated by the organization. This authorization shall remain in effect until revoked by me allowing up to 30 days time to change the payroll records in order to make effective this assignment or revocation thereof or until another employee organization becomes my exclusive representative.

It is understood that this authorization shall become void in the event the employee organization's eligibility for payroll deduction terminates for any reason. Upon termination of my employment with the University, this authorization will no longer be in effect. This authorization does not include dues, initiation fees and general assessments to cover any time prior to the payroll period in which the initial deduction is made. Payroll deductions including those legally required and those authorized by an employee are assigned priorities. In the event there are insufficient earnings to cover all required and authorized deductions, it is understood that deductions will be taken in the order assigned by the University and no adjustment will be made in a subsequent pay period for membership dues, initiation fees and general assessments.

Employee Signature _____

Date _____

For University Use Only Tran Code _____ Employee ID No _____ Date _____ Element No. _____ Bal CD _____ Amount _____

